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1 Introduction
The aim of this work is to introduce media in a model of electoral competition. We take as
a benchmark the Downsian model of electoral competition, as widely done in this strand
of literature. The Downsian model, introduced in Downs (1957), builds on the classical
Hotelling model of spatial competition (Hotelling, 1929), turning buyers into voters and
firms into political parties; in fact, it is sometimes referred to as Hotelling-Downs model.
The skeleton of the model is rather simple: roughly speaking, a number of parties propose
a policy from a given unidimensional policy space and, afterwards, voters choose the policy
that they consider more appropriate (traditionally, every voter has an ideal policy and
chooses the proposed one closer to it). However, when going into detail, many different
assumptions can be found in the literature. De Donder and Gallego (2017) provides a
quite complete summary of the main ones, their motivation and their effect on the model.
It is interesting to notice that, in many (if not all) of the aspects that need to be modeled,
there is not a “correct” set of assumptions, but different electoral processes might lead to
different valid assumptions.
Crucial assumptions of the classical Downsian model have to do with the goal of the
candidates and how voters penalize deviations from their ideal policies. Concerning the
goal of the candidates, there are three main assumptions in the literature: candidates want
to maximize their chances to win 1, candidates want to maximize their expected vote-
share or candidates are policy-motivated. Although we do not use it here, some authors,
in the spirit of Calvert (1985), allow for mixed motivations via linear combinations of
the above. Concerning how voters penalize deviations from their ideal policies, there are
two main approaches: voters are risk-neutral or voters are risk-averse. In this paper we
consider that voters are risk-averse and that candidates can be either winning chances
maximizers or vote-share maximizers. We present the model, some basic results related to
the classical theory and we are able to extend in our setting the main result of Aragonès
and Xefteris (2012).
In particular, we adopt what in this strand of literature is usually referred to as a
“valence model”, which takes into account the importance of the non-policy evaluations,
or valences, of candidates by the electorate. These evaluations, or valences, are often
understood as the quality of a candidate, and they are introduced in the Downsian model
based on the seminal papers Stokes (1963, 1992). Papers such as the aforementioned
Aragonès and Xefteris (2012), Groseclose (2001) and Hummel (2010) investigate, as we
partly do here, the consequences of a difference in candidate quality (with two competing
candidates).
1Downs (1957) only considers the case of candidates that maximize their chances to win. The other
two motives appeared later in the literature.
3
The introduction of media in such models is a recent issue. Despite the fact that
we do not aim to provide an exhaustive picture of the different forms this introduction
has adopted in the existing literature, since we follow a remarkably different path, we
make a couple of general comments. Although in every “category” different assumptions
and details can be found (hence, what follows needs to be taken lightly), there are two
main ideas authors have used to introduce media in the Downsian model: i) there are
several “states of the nature” and media outlets inform voters on the realized state; ii)
media outlets are in charge of informing voters of the policies proposed by the candidates.
Interesting examples of the first path are Puglisi (2007) and, specially, Chan and Suen
(2009). A key modelling difference between our work and Chan and Suen (2009) is that we
consider that voters are non-strategic when it comes to information, in the sense that we
assume that they are not aware of the goals of media, which biases the true state of nature
in their model, and the true quality of candidates in ours. We take this assumption in
light of Pew Research Center (2018), which points towards consumers of a certain media
outlet believing that it reflects their own personal views. On the second path, we highlight
the recent Miura (2019), which studies the incentives of a biased media outlet to provide
voters with ambiguous information on the policies proposed by the candidates. Although
this latter study and ours differ significantly on the modelling strategy, when we analyze
the case of risk-neutral voters (which is how Miura (2019) considers voters to be), we get
a similar conclusion: if media is not too biased, usual properties of the Downsian model
are recovered.
Another crucial difference of our study with the aforementioned ones, and with most
of the literature on the topic, is that we assume media outlets to be non-strategic. The
reason underneath is that it seems rather impossible to introduce in a model of electoral
competition all the incentives and constraints that a media outlet has in real life. That
is why, based on Pew Research Center (2018), which studies the European case, and
Lott and Hassett (2004) and Groseclose and Milyo (2005), which study the USA case, we
exogenously simulate how media outlets behave introducing ourselves a certain bias.
We have already justified why we assume that voters and media outlets are non-
strategic. Another important assumption of our model has to do with the coverage of
each media outlet: we assume that there are two media outlets (a leftist one and a
rightist one) and some voters with ideal policies on the left consume the rightist media
outlet. First of all, notice that the assumption could be reversed without any change in
the analysis of the model. It could be the leftist media outlet the one that attracts voters
from the other side of the political spectrum and the conclusions would be derived in
the same way and would be symmetrically identical. However, our assumption is based
again on Pew Research Center (2018), which highlights the divergence in some European
countries of the political stance of the consumers of a particular media outlet and the
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political position occupied by the outlet 2. This divergence is particularly accentuated in
Spain and Italy for the most consumed media outlets, which appear to be more rightist
than the mean of their consumers.
Concerning the information that media outlets transmit, and although the model in-
volves different elements, we proceed similarly as Chan and Suen (2009). As they do,
we assume that voters receive the true policies proposed and that media provides some
additional information. In their study, it is the true state of nature, and in ours it is the
quality of each candidate. As they put it:
While a media outlet may quote a candidate selectively, on the whole it has
little leeway in the reporting of this kind of information. (Chan and Suen,
2009; p.802).
Related to different information on the quality of the candidates among media outlets
because of political differences, there are multiple recent examples: Spanish OK diario
claiming that Pablo Iglesias had received money from the Government of Iran (case re-
cently closed); or, again in Spain, the claims on Pedro Sánchez plagiarizing his PhD thesis
or on Albert Rivera being part of a fascist movement when young. These are shocking
examples of manipulation (fake news) that attack the quality of a candidate. However,
the effect we put into the model can be subtler than that: different media outlets might
deliver different information on the quality of the candidates, either manipulating or not
(they can highlight different true information, in the spirit of Puglisi (2007), which works
with states of nature). The point is that media outlets channel differences with the pro-
posed policies through candidate quality: if they agree with a proposed policy, they help
the candidate releasing information supporting his quality, and conversely if they do not.
This mechanism can also be supported by means of the 2016 Trump-Clinton electoral
race and other non-Spanish related examples. However, I want to point out that we are
dealing with media in the classical meaning of the term; we do not pretend to study the
effect of social networks such as Twitter. The effect and incentives of social media might
differ substantially and are beyond the scope of this work, although they are often also
fed by attacks to the quality of a candidate (Lee and Xu, 2018).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce the general model
that we work on and that we have partly described in this Introduction. Afterwards, in
section 3, we derive some basic properties of the model concerning PSNE and, in section
4, we focus on the extension of the main result of Aragonès and Xefteris (2012). At last,
in section 5, we address some concluding remarks and comment on further research.
2The political position of a particular media outlet is measured taking into account the opinion among
all consumers/voters.
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2 Description of the game
A game of electoral competition with valences and media is defined by the following ele-
ments:
i) The policy space: X = [0, 1].
ii) The set of voters, V , each one of whom has a unique ideal policy vi ∈ [0, 1].
iii) The set of candidates, C = {1, . . . , n}.
iv) A density function f describing the distribution of voters’ ideal policy platforms.
v) The utility functions of the voters, {ui}i∈V .
vi) The utility functions of the candidates, {wj}j∈C .
vii) The maximum transmitted quality of each candidate, {kj}j∈C .
viii) The set of media outlets, M = {1, . . . ,m}.
ix) The media outlet that consumes each voter, defined by a function µ : V →M .
x) The “media influence functions” of each outlet for each candidate, {gm,j}m∈M,j∈C .
For example, function g1,2 reflects how a voter informed through media outlet 1
perceives the quality of candidate 2.
The game consists of two stages: in the first stage each of the candidates chooses
a policy xj ∈ [0, 1]; and in the second stage each voter votes for the candidate that
maximizes his utility. However, since voters cannot behave strategically (voting their
most preferred candidate weakly-dominates any other strategy), the game can be seen as
a one-shot game where candidates choose the policy they propose (the first-stage of the
game). With that in mind, a game of electoral competition with valences and media is
defined by a tuple of the elements just listed above:
(X, V,C, f, {ui}i∈V , {wj}j∈C , {kj}j∈C ,M, µ, {gm,j}m∈M,j∈C). (2.1)
Let us now discuss the assumptions we take in regard to these elements. First of all,
as in many studies on electoral competition, we assume that there are two candidates,
that is n = 2. We assume that there is a continuum of voters and that the distribution
defined by f is symmetric with respect to 1/2. Regarding the media outlets, we assume
that there are two of them, which we denote by L (left-wing) and R (right-wing), and that
there exists L < 1/2 such that voters with ideal policies in [0, L] consume media outlet L
and voters with ideal policies in (L, 1] consume media outlet R (noting this threshold L
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might look like a slight abuse of notation, but is very intuitive and does not originate any
misunderstanding in the analysis, where media outlets are limited to sub-indices). This
explanation clearly defines the function µ.
We will take into account two different assumptions for the utilities of the candidates:
they can either want to maximize their winning chances or maximize their expected vote-
share. The main result assumes that candidates maximize their vote-share. Voters are
assumed to be risk-averse, that is, in our model, that the utility a voter with ideal policy
v ∈ [0, 1] who observes quality k for a candidate proposing policy x, is k − (x− v)2.
At last, the functions {gm,j}m∈M,j∈C will be discussed in the next section, where an
example will show the importance of their shape.
Definition 1. From now on, in order to keep statements reasonably long, we will call
simply a game of electoral competition with media any game of the form (2.1) with 2 media
outlets (L and R), 2 candidates, the function µ specified above and risk-averse voters.
Regarding the assumptions on media influence functions, we find it appropriate to
devote a little bit of time to justify the shape of the functions we will consider. Let the
following subsection be an explanation of it.
2.1 Media functions: shape and role
In this subsection we see that, even if all media functions are parabolic and concave, it
may happen that there exists a policy v ∈ (L, 1] such that voters who have it as their
ideal policy vote for the candidate proposing the policy more to the left and that some
voters with ideal policies in [0, L] vote for the candidate proposing the policy more to the
right. This feels unnatural and we want to avoid such phenomenon.
We see that this phenomenon might take place even when we limit ourselves to
parabolic media functions. In fact, it is the product of different “influence abilities” from
the media outlets, as we clearly see in the following example.
Example 1. Assume L = 0.4, xL = 0.2, xR = 0.7, x = 0.65, y = 0.8, k2 = 0.5 and
k1 = 0.3. Assume that the media functions are as follows:
gL,2(y) = −0.5y2 + 0.2y + 0.42,
gL,1(x) = gL,2(x)− 0.2,
gR,2(y) = −18y2 + 25.2y − 8.32,
gR,1(x) = gR,2(x)− 0.2.
Plotting them:
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Figure 1: Media functions of Example 1.
Then, just by computing, it is immediate to check that gL,2(y)− gL,1(x) > (y− 0.4)2−
(x − 0.4)2 and that, therefore, voters with ideal policy L vote for candidate 2. On the
other hand, gR,1(x) − gR,2(y) > (x − 0.5)2 − (y − 0.5)2 and the voters with ideal policy
1/2, vote for candidate 1.
This example has a very clear interpretation. Looking at the plots, it is clear that
the rightist media outlet has a greater ability to influence the perceived the quality of
the candidates. Since we assume media to be non-strategic, this fact might have several
explanations outside of the model. A reasonable explanation seems to be that, in an
example such as the one proposed, leftist media outlet consumers trust less what the
media says, which causes this media outlet to only be able to mildly manipulate the
perceived quality of the candidates in their interest.
This phenomenon clearly cannot take place when the valences are perceived the same
by all voters, as in the vast majority of previous literature in the topic (if not all). As it is
clear, in particular, it could cause that the candidate supported by neutral voters would
not win the election.
In order to avoid the non-regular behavior observed in the above example, we assume
the media functions adopt the following form, for some a > 0.
gL,1(x) = −ax2 + 2axLx+ (k1 − ax2L),
gL,2(x) = −ax2 + 2axLx+ (k2 − ax2L),
gR,1(x) = −ax2 + 2axRx+ (k1 − ax2R),
gR,2(x) = −ax2 + 2axRx+ (k2 − ax2R).
(2.2)
As we see next, these media functions, which basically tie the ability to influence of
the media outlets to each other, avoid the appearance of what we have just discussed.
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3 A first analysis of the model: basic properties and
PSNE
Formally, the utility of a voter with ideal policy v of voting candidate j when he proposes
xj takes the form:
uv(xj) = gL,R(xj)− (xj − v)2.
=⇒ uv(xj) = (−a− 1)x2j + (2axL,R + 2v)xj − (kj − ax2L,R − v2).
As in the rest of the document, we assume that candidate 1 proposes x and candidate
2 proposes y. It will be useful to consider:
∆v = uv(x)− uv(y) = (a+ 1)(y2 − x2)− 2(axR,L + v)(y − x) + k1 − k2.
This utility form has also been exploited in the literature, being Aragonès and Xefteris
(2012) a particularly pertinent example, and which main result we will put to the test
in our model. One of the main technical advantages of this assumption is that when
candidates propose different policies, there is at most one policy such that voters who
have it as the ideal one are indifferent (which is something that does not happen when
voters are risk-neutral). We prove this next.
3.1 Voting patterns
We start by assessing which candidates do the voters vote for, once the candidates have
chosen two policy platforms.
Proposition 1. Let be a game of electoral competition with media and media functions
as in (2.2). If x 6= y, there is at most one policy such that voters who have it as the most
preferred one are indifferent.
Proof. Assume that voters such that v ∈ (L, 1] are indifferent between the proposed
policies x and y. This happens if, and only if,
∆v = (a+ 1)(y
2 − x2)− 2(axR + v)(y − x) + k1 − k2 = 0.
Since y and x are fixed (and y − x 6= 0), the LHS is a linear function on v and, as a
consequence, intersects at most once with the horizontal axis. Furthermore, for any voter
such that v′ ∈ [0, L],
∆v′ = (a+ 1)(y
2 − x2)− 2(axL + v′)(y − x) + k1 − k2 ≷ 0,
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since xL < xR and v′ < v, hence 2(axL + v′) ≷ 2(axR + v)). The proof is completely
analogous if it is assumed that v ∈ [0, L]. 
Proposition 2. Let be a game of electoral competition with media and media functions
as in (2.2). If x 6= y and there exists a policy v ∈ [0, 1] such that voters who have it as
the ideal one are indifferent, then the voters with ideal policy v′ < v vote for min{x, y}
and voters with ideal policy v′′ > v vote for max{x, y}.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that x < y. We have to see that if a voter with
ideal policy v votes for x so does a voter with ideal policy v′ < v. It is clearly enough to
see that
v′ < v =⇒ ∆v < ∆v′ ;
but since x < y, this is clear.
It is analogous to prove that if a voter with ideal policy v votes for y so does a voter
with ideal policy v′ > v 
Proposition 3. Let be a game of electoral competition with media and media functions as
in (2.2). A voter with ideal policy v ∈ [0, 1] has his utility maximized when the candidate
chooses the policy platform x = (axR,L + v)/(a+ 1), which clearly belongs to [0, 1].
From now on, we will denote by z∗ the policy that a candidate has to propose in order
to maximize the utility of neutral voters, which, in light of the last proposition is
z∗ =
axR + 1/2
a+ 1
. (3.1)
3.2 Pure strategy Nash equilibria
From the results in the previous subsection, we can easily infer some results on the exis-
tence and shape of PSNE.
Proposition 4. Let be a game of electoral competition with media, media functions as in
(2.2) and winning chances maximizing candidates. If k1 = k2, the only PSNE is (z∗, z∗).
Proof. Assume k1 = k2 and, without loss of generality, that x 6= z∗. Then candidate 2
wins for sure the election by proposing z∗, since all voters with ideal policy the segment
[0, 1/2] or [1/2, 1] (the one without x) will vote for him. Hence, since with the profile
(1/2, 1/2) both candidates have the same chance of winning, this is the only PSNE. 
Proposition 5. Let be a game of electoral competition with media, media functions as
in (2.2) and winning chances maximizing candidates. If k1 6= k2, the candidate with a
natural advantage wins in any PSNE by proposing z∗.
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Proposition 6. Let be a game of electoral competition with media, media functions as in
(2.2) and vote-share maximizing candidates. If k1 = k2, the only PSNE is (z∗, z∗).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one of Proposition 4. With the same argument we
can conclude that any candidate facing z∗ sees his expected vote-share maximized at z∗.
Furthermore, the same can be used to argue that in any other equilibrium, where z∗ was
not proposed by anybody, some of the candidates would benefit from deviating to z∗.

4 A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE)
In this subsection we aim to extend the existence of the MSNE derived in Aragonès and
Xefteris (2012) for a model with candidate quality but no media (that is, constant quality
perception among voters) to our model including media.
Their model is “simpler” than the one we are dealing with, in the sense that there
are no media outlets and, as a consequence, the valences of the candidates are perceived
equally by all voters. In their study, it is assumed that there is a finite and odd number of
voters, with ideal policies randomly drawn from the uniform distribution in [0, 1]. They
try to characterize equilibria when candidates maximize their winning chances. As the
authors point out in the paper, this is equivalent to studying the behavior of vote-share
maximizing candidates when there is a continuum of voters and the distribution of voters’
ideal policies follows a symmetric Beta distribution with parameters a = b = (n+ 1)/2.
Hence, in our analysis, we are doing the latter exercise: study the existence of equilibria
for vote-share maximizing candidates and under the presence of media. However, for
convenience, we use the intuition behind the model in Aragonès and Xefteris (2012),
with and odd number of voters, n. We assume that candidate 1 proposes policy x and
candidate 2 proposes policy y (and any policy y with a subindex). Furthermore, assume
that candidate 1 has a natural advantage over candidate 2 of d = k1 − k2 > 0.
We try to reproduce the MSNE derived in Aragonès and Xefteris (2012). In their model,
there is only one MSNE, where candidate 1 proposes 1/2 and candidate 2 randomizes with
probability 1/2 over two policies symmetric with respect to 1/2. In our model, if the result
carries on, we expect to find an equilibrium where candidate 1 proposes z∗ and candidate
2 randomizes with probability 1/2 over two policies symmetric with respect to z∗; where
z∗ is defined by (3.1).
Let p(x, y) denote the probability that candidate 1 (who proposes x) is elected by a
voter randomly drawn form the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. If x < y, a voter with ideal
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policy v ∈ [0, 1] votes for candidate 1 if, and only if,
− ax2 + 2axL,Rx+ k1 − ax2L,R − (x− v)2 > −ay2 + 2axL,Ry + k2 − ax2L,R − (y − v)2
⇐⇒ v < (a+ 1)(y + x)
2
+
d
2(y − x) − axL,R,
where xL,R is xL if the voter is informed via the leftist media outlet, and it is xR if it is
informed via the rightist one.
Since we will extensively work with this expression, we denote the RHS of the last
inequality by xˆL,R(x, y) (which are two expressions, xˆL(x, y) and xˆR(x, y), resulting from
considering a voter informed by L or by R).
It is immediate that, if y < x the condition translates to v > xˆL,R. Furthermore, it is
clear that xˆL > xˆR. Hence, working a little bit on the different cases that arise, we can
write in a compact way:
p(x, y) =

min{max{0, xˆL}, L}+ min{1− L,max{xˆR − L, 0}} if x < y
1 if x = y
max{L−max{0, xˆL}, 0}+ max{0, 1−max{xˆR, L}} if y < x
(4.1)
Let q(x, y) = 1 − p(x, y) be the probability that the voter votes for candidate 2.
Then, given n voters (we assume n odd) independently randomly drawn from the uniform
distribution over [0, 1], we consider the probabilities of winning the election (P refers to
candidate 1 and Q to candidate 2):
Pn(x, y) =
n∑
k=(n+1)/2
(
n
k
)
p(x, y)k(1− p(x, y))n−k,
Qn(x, y) =
n∑
k=(n+1)/2
(
n
k
)
q(x, y)k(1− q(x, y))n−k = 1− Pn(x, y).
As we have stated, we aim to prove that, for n large enough, there is a MSNE where
candidate 1 proposes z∗. Hence, next we study which are the best replies that candi-
date 2 might have to candidate 1 proposing z∗. As shown in Kirstein and Wagenheim
(2010), Qn(q) is an S-shaped function, increasing in [0, 1]. Hence, in order to maximize
Qn(q(z
∗, y)), candidate 2 has to maximize q(z∗, y).
Proposition 7. Let be a game of electoral competition with media, media functions as
in (2.2) and vote-share maximizing candidates. If candidate 1 proposes z∗ and L ≤
1/2 − √d(a+ 1), then candidate 2 has two best replies: y∗L = z∗ − √d/(a+ 1) and
y∗R = z
∗ +
√
d/(a+ 1). Furthermore, q(z∗, y∗L) = q(z∗, y∗R) = 1/2−
√
d(a+ 1).
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Proof. In the first place, notice that the condition 1/2 −√d(a+ 1) > L implies both
1/2 +
√
d(a+ 1) < 1 and z∗ +
√
d/(a+ 1) ≤ 1. The first implication is obvious and
the second one is purely technical and can be easily checked by taking into account that
z∗ = 1/2+axR
a+1
.
As we have said, we need to maximize q(z∗, y). First of all, consider the domain
z∗ < y. In this case it is clear that, in particular, voters with ideal policy v = 1/2 vote
for candidate 1, so xˆL > xˆR > L. Hence, in this case,
q(x, y) = 1− p(x, y) = 1−min{1, xˆR}.
Hence, candidate 2 wants to minimize xˆR (if he can make it less than 1). Derivating
xˆR(z
∗, y) and equating to 0, we get the solution: y∗R = z∗+
√
d/(a+ 1), which we assume
to be in [0, 1]. The second derivative is trivially positive and we have found the minimum
of xˆR(z∗, y) in the desired domain. However, in order for it to be the maximum of q(z∗, y)
in the domain, we need to check that xˆR(z∗, y∗R) < 1. And we have that xˆR(z∗, y∗R) =
1/2 +
√
d(a+ 1) < 1, which once again, we assume to fulfill the technical requirement.
Let us move on to the case y < z∗. Now, taking into account that, if y < z∗,
xˆR(z
∗, y) < 1/2, since neutral voters vote for candidate 1, it can be derived from the
general expressions shown of p(x, y) that:
q(x, y) =

0 if xˆL ≤ 0
xˆL if 0 < xˆL ≤ L
L if L < xˆL and xˆR ≤ L
max{1, xˆR} if L < xˆR
First of all, we try to maximize xˆR(y, z∗) for y < z∗, and then we check whether
L < xˆR or not; if the latter condition holds, we are done. The maximization easily
yields: y∗L = z∗ −
√
d/(a+ 1), which implies xˆR(z∗, y∗L) = 1/2 −
√
d(a+ 1), and taken
into account our assumptions, xˆR(z∗, y∗L) > L.

Now we need to check if proposing z∗ is a best reply for candidate 1 to the mixed
strategy consisting in randomizing between y∗L and y∗R with probability 1/2. From now
on we denote this mixed strategy σ∗2.
Lemma 1. The function ρ(x), defined as
ρ(x) =
p(x, y∗L)(1− p(x, y∗L))
p(x, y∗R)(1− p(x, y∗R)
,
is strictly increasing in all the domain it is properly defined, that is [y∗L, ψ0), where ψ0 is
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such that p(ψ0, y∗R) = 1 and p(x, y∗R) < 1 for any x ∈ [y∗L, ψ0).
Proof. It is fundamental to have a deeper understanding of the functions p(x, y∗L) and
p(x, y∗R) in the interval of interest, that is [y∗L, y∗R]. By taking a close look to (4.1), we can
conclude that:
i) p(x, y∗L) = 1 if x ∈ [y∗L, θ0], is strictly decreasing if x ∈ [θ0, θl), p(x, y∗L) = 1 − L
if x ∈ [θl, θr] and is strictly decreasing if x ∈ [θr, y∗R]; where θ0 < θl < θr < z∗.
Furthermore, for all x ∈ [y∗L, y∗R], p(x, y∗L) > 1/2.
L
1/2−√d(a + 1)
1/2−√d(a + 1)/4
1
θl θr
z∗ y∗Ry
∗
L
θ0 x
xˆR(x; y
∗
L)
xˆL(x; y
∗
L)
1/2
1− L
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∗
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p(x; y∗L)
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Figure 2: Plots of xˆL(x, y∗L), xˆR(x, y∗L) and p(x, y∗L) on the interval [y∗L, y∗R], with parameters
that satisfy: 1/2−√d(a+ 1) > L. In particular, the plots haven been obtained by using
a=1, d=0.01, xL = 0.25, xR = 0.75 and L = 0.25.
ii) p(x, y∗R) = 1 if x ∈ [ψ0, y∗R], and is strictly increasing if x ∈ [y∗L, ψ0); where z∗ < ψ0.
Furthermore, for all x ∈ [y∗L, y∗R], p(x, y∗R) > 1/2.
On the other hand, considering the function f(p) = p(1− p), it is easily checked that, if
p > 1/2, it is decreasing in p. Hence, with the description provided of the functions p(x, y∗L)
and p(x, y∗R) in the interval [y∗L, y∗R], it is already clear that ρ(x) is strictly increasing in
[y∗L, ψ0) and ρ(x) = +∞ if x ∈ [θr, y∗R].

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The technical lemma that follows will prove useful in the proof of Proposition 8, which
follows immediately afterwards.
Lemma 2. The following holds:
lim
x→x∗+
∂
− ∂p(x,y
∗
R)
∂x
∂p(x,y∗
L
)
∂x
∂x
=
4
√
d
(a+ 1)2
(√
a+ 1 +
√
d
) . (4.2)
Proof. If x ∈ (θ−, z∗) with θr < θ−, then p(x, y∗R) = xˆR(x, y∗R) and p(x, y∗L) = 1−xˆR(x, y∗L).
As a consequence:
lim
x→x∗+
∂
− ∂p(x,y
∗
R)
∂x
∂p(x,y∗
L
)
∂x
∂x
= lim
x→x∗+
∂
− ∂xˆR(x,y
∗
R)
∂x
∂(1−xˆR(x,y∗L))
∂x
∂x
.
We have that,
−∂xˆR(x,y∗R)
∂x
∂(1−xˆR(x,y∗L))
∂x
=
a+1
2
+ d
2(y∗R−x)2
a+1
2
+ d
2(y∗L−x)2
=⇒
∂
− ∂xˆR(x,y
∗
R)
∂x
∂(1−xˆR(x,y∗L))
∂x
∂x
=
(
a+1
2
+ d
2(y∗L−x)2
)
d
(y∗R−x)3 −
(
a+1
2
+ d
2(y∗R−x)2
)
d
(y∗L−x)3(
a+1
2
+ d
2(y∗L−x)2
)2 .
Substituting x = z∗, the expression can be simplified, since (y∗R−z∗)2 = (y∗L−z∗)2 and
(y∗R − z∗)3 = −(y∗L − z∗)3. Hence,
∂
− ∂xˆR(x,y
∗
R)
∂x
∂(1−xˆR(x,y∗L))
∂x
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=z∗
=
4d
(y∗R−z∗)3
a+ 1 + d
(y∗L−z∗)2
=
4
√
d
(a+ 1)2
(√
a+ 1 +
√
d
) .

Proposition 8. Let be a game of electoral competition with media, media functions as
in (2.2) and vote-share maximizing candidates. If candidate 2 uses the mixed strategy σ∗2,
proposing z∗ is the only best reply of candidate 1 for n large enough.
Proof. First of all, notice that any mixed strategy of candidate 1 only involves policies in
the interval [θ0, ψ0]. If he proposed a policy outside of this interval, proposing θ0 or ψ0
would clearly strictly dominate it. (The key is that if x < y, then xˆL,R(x, y) are strictly
increasing functions of x in the domain; and if y < x, xˆL,R(x, y) are as well).
It is clear that the derivative of p(x, y∗L) is not defined at θ0 and that the derivative of
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p(x, y∗R) is not defined at ψ0. However, we can assume that the derivative is defined as
the right and left limit, respectively.
When candidate 1 maximizes Pn(x, σ∗2), let us focus first on the interval [θ0, ψ0], as just
argued. By Kirstein and Wagenheim (2010) we know that:
∂Pn(x, σ
∗
2)
∂x
=
n
2
(
n− 1
(n− 1)/2
)(
(p(x, y∗L)(1− p(x, y∗L)))(n−1)/2
∂p(x, y∗L)
∂x
)
+
n
2
(
n− 1
(n− 1)/2
)(
(p(x, y∗R)(1− p(x, y∗R)))(n−1)/2
∂p(x, y∗R)
∂x
) (4.3)
With this expression, it is immediate to check that ∂Pn(x,σ
∗
2)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=z∗
= 0, since, in a
neighbourhood of z∗, p(x, y∗L) = 1−xˆR(x, y∗L) and p(x, y∗R) = xˆR(x, y∗R), and the derivatives
are straightforward.
We want to prove that for n large enough, z∗ is a global maximum of Pn(x, σ∗2). We
split the proof in two parts:
i) We see that, for any θ− ∈ (θr, z∗) and any θ+ ∈ (z∗, ψ0), there exists n large enough
such that ∂Pn(x,y
∗
L)
∂x
> 0 for all x ∈ (y∗L, θ−] and ∂Pn(x,y
∗
L)
∂x
< 0 for all x ∈ [θ+, y∗R).
ii) We see that that there exist θ− ∈ (θr, z∗), θ+ ∈ (z∗, ψ0) and n large enough such
that, for all n′ ≥ n, ∂Pn(x,y∗L)
∂x
> 0 for all x ∈ (θ−, z∗) and ∂Pn(x,y∗L)
∂x
< 0 for all
x ∈ (z∗, θ+).
Since it is clear that p(x, y∗R)(1− p(x, y∗R)) 6= 0 for any x ∈ [θ0, z∗), working a little bit
on equation (4.3), we get that ∂Pn(x,y
∗
L)
∂x
> 0 if, and only if,
(
p(x, y∗L)(1− p(x, y∗L))
p(x, y∗R)(1− p(x, y∗R)
)(n−1)/2
∂p(x, y∗L)
∂x
+
∂p(x, y∗R)
∂x
> 0. (4.4)
By means of Lemma 1, since p(z∗, y∗L) = p(z∗, y∗R) and 1− p(z∗, y∗L) = 1− p(z∗, y∗R), it
is immediate that for all x ∈ [θ0, z∗),
p(x, y∗L)(1− p(x, y∗L))
p(x, y∗R)(1− p(x, y∗R)
< 1.
At this point it is interesting to notice that, with the notation introduced in Lemma
1, proposing any policy in [θl, θr) cannot be optimal for candidate 1, since the probability
provided by any such policy is strictly dominated by the probability provided by propos-
ing θr; strict domination being a consequence of p(x, y∗L) being strictly increasing in this
domain. Hence, it is sufficient to see that ∂Pn(x,y
∗
L)
∂x
> 0 for x ∈ [θ0, θl) ∪ [θr, z∗). Further-
more, in this domain, we have that ∂p(x,y
∗
R)
∂x
> 0 and that ∂p(x,y
∗
L)
∂x
< 0 is bounded. Hence,
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taking into account Lemma 1 , given θ− ∈ (θr, z∗), there exists n1 > 0 large enough such
that (4.4) holds for all x ∈ [y∗L, θ−].
The proof of ∂Pn(x,σ
∗
2)
∂x
< 0 if x ∈ [θ+, y∗R] is analogous for n large enough, and follows in
a similar way (actually slightly less complicated way, since θl and θr do not play a role)
after dividing (4.4) by ρ(x)(n−1)/2. This exercise provides n2.
In order to prove ii) we should see that there exist θ− ∈ (θr, z∗) and n large enough such
that ∂Pn(x,y
∗
L)
∂x
> 0 for all x ∈ (θ−, z∗). Once again, this condition is given by (4.4), which
can be rewritten as (taking into account the signs of the expressions under logarithms)
n > 2
ln
(
−
∂p(x,y∗R)
∂x
∂p(x,y∗
L
)
∂x
)
ln
(
p(x,y∗L)(1−p(x,y∗L))
p(x,y∗R)(1−p(x,y∗R)
) + 1.
It is fundamental to notice that the RHS is a continuous function in (θ−, z∗)∪ (z∗, θ+) (in
other words, it only has a discontinuity in z∗ in the domain of interest). Once again, we
focus on the left side of z∗ and later argue that the equivalent study for the other side is
completely analogous. Hence, we take the limit of the RHS when x approaches z∗ from
the left.
First of all, we immediately notice that the substituting z∗ in the above expression
we get an indeterminacy that allows us to use L’Hôpital’s rule. Derivating both the
numerator and the denominator we get:
lim
x→x∗+
ln
(
−
∂p(x,y∗R)
∂x
∂p(x,y∗
L
)
∂x
)
ln
(
p(x,y∗L)(1−p(x,y∗L))
p(x,y∗R)(1−p(x,y∗R)
) + 1 = lim
x→x∗+
(
−
∂p(x,y∗L)
∂x
∂p(x,y∗
R
)
∂x
) ∂ ∂p(x,y∗R)∂x
∂p(x,y∗
L
)
∂x
∂x(
p(x,y∗R)(1−p(x,y∗R)
p(x,y∗L)(1−p(x,y∗L))
) ∂ p(x,y∗L)(1−p(x,y∗L))
p(x,y∗
R
)(1−p(x,y∗
R
)
∂x
+ 1.
Trivially (that is why we had an indeterminacy before),
lim
x→x∗+
−
∂p(x,y∗L)
∂x
∂p(x,y∗R)
∂x
= lim
x→x∗+
p(x, y∗R)(1− p(x, y∗R)
p(x, y∗L)(1− p(x, y∗L))
= 1.
Moving on, in Lemma 2 we have proved that:
lim
x→x∗+
∂
− ∂p(x,y
∗
R)
∂x
∂p(x,y∗
L
)
∂x
∂x
=
4
√
d
(a+ 1)2
(√
a+ 1 +
√
d
) . (4.5)
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And at this point, if we prove that
lim
x→x∗+
∂
p(x,y∗L)(1−p(x,y∗L))
p(x,y∗R)(1−p(x,y∗R)
∂x
> 0,
we can already assert that the limit of interest is finite. But this is something that we
know from lemma 3 (notice that close to z∗, ρ(x) is continuous and derivable).
Hence, given n greater than the finite limit just shown, there exists θ− < z∗ such that
∂Pn(x,σ∗2)
∂x
> 0 if x ∈ (θ−, z∗).
In a completely analogous way, it can be proved the corresponding result for the right
side. In fact, working on the opposite inequality of (4.4), that is what we want to proof
in the case being discussed, it is immediate that the limit to solve is the same, hence it
can be solved in the exact same way. 
A very natural question to ask ourselves at this point is: what happens if 1/2 −√
d(a+ 1) < L? Let the following result be an answer (we present before a technical
lemma and an straightforward corollary).
Lemma 3. If  ∈ (0, 1− z∗], then the following holds:
xˆR(z
∗, z∗ − ) = 1− xˆR(z∗, z∗ + ).
Corollary 1. If 0 < q(z∗, z∗ − ) = xˆL(z∗, z∗ − ) ≤ L, then q(z∗, z∗ + ) < q(z∗, z∗ − ).
The last corollary is just the materialization of a very intuitive concept in the setting we
are working on: it is easier to attract consumers of the leftist media outlet by deviating
to the left rather than attracting consumers of the rightist media by deviating to the
right. However, this effect is offset when the deviation to the left is also able to attract
consumers of the rightist media; which is why we have an equilibrium in that case.
Proposition 9. Let be a game of electoral competition with media, media functions as in
(2.2) and vote-share maximizing candidates. If 1/2−√d(a+ 1) < L, the profile (z∗, σ∗2)
is a MSNE if, and only if, candidate 2 has no chance to get a positive vote-share when
facing z∗.
Proof. If candidate 2 has no chance to get a positive vote-share when facing z∗, then is
is clear that any feasible profile involving z∗ by candidate 1 is a MSNE. Let us prove the
reverse.
It is useful to consider several cases. Notice that y∗L < 0 ⇐⇒ 1/2−
√
d(a+ 1) < −axR
and 1 < y∗R ⇐⇒ 1/2−
√
d(a+ 1) < −a(1− xR); using these conditions we can separate
the proof in several cases:
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i) Case 1: y∗L < 0. Then, considering y < x, the best candidate 2 can do is to propose 0
(clear by looking at the second derivative of xˆL,R(z∗, y)). Since xˆL = xˆR+a(xR−xL)
and xˆR(z∗, y∗L) = 1/2 +
√
d(a+ 1), we have that
xˆL(z
∗.y∗L) < −axR + a(xR − xL) = −axL.
Hence, q(z∗, 0) ≤ q(z∗.y∗L) = 0. As we have commented, then q(z, 1) ≤ q(z∗.y∗R) = 0
as well.
To conclude, in this case candidate 2 has no chance of getting a positive vote-share,
hence proposing any y ∈ [0, 1] and any mixed strategy yields the same expected
outcome.
ii) Case 2: 0 ≤ y∗L and 1 < y∗R. If 1/2 −
√
d(a+ 1) + a(xR − xL) > 0 (which can
happen), then proposing y∗L weakly dominates any other policy. Otherwise, if 1/2−√
d(a+ 1)+a(xR−xL) ≤ 0, the choice is irrelevant and it is impossible for candidate
2 to get a positive vote-share.
iii) Case 3: 0 ≤ y∗L, y∗R ≤ 1 and 1/2−
√
d(a+ 1) < L. So
a(xR − 1) ≤ 1/2−
√
d(a+ 1) < L.
Once again, if 1/2−√d(a+ 1)+a(xR−xL) > 0 (which can happen), then proposing
y∗L weakly dominates any other policy and if not, there is no relevant choice.

We can wrap up all the results we have gathered up to this point in this section in the
form of the following theorem:
Teorema 1. Let be a game of electoral competition with media, media functions as in
(2.2) and vote-share maximizing candidates. There exists n large enough such that the
profile of mixed strategies (z∗, σ∗2) is a MSNE if 1/2−
√
d(a+ 1) ≥ L. For any such n, if
1/2 −√d(a+ 1) < L, then (z∗, σ∗2) is not a MSNE unless candidate 2 has no chance to
get a positive vote-share when facing z∗.
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